The memorandum of understanding signed earlier this year by Hargeisa and Addis Ababa is playing a major role in the battle between re-election hopeful Muse Bihi and his main rival Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi. The result of next month’s poll will seal the fate of the MoU.
The presidential election in Somaliland, scheduled for 13 November, promises to be closely contested. A controversial – and still secret – memorandum of understanding (MoU) about Ethiopia potentially recognising Somaliland in return for being granted an access to the port of Berbera and a lease of coastal land on which to build a naval base – has drawn significant attention from neighbouring countries. Mindful that the country is tiring of the Kulmiye party after its 14 years in power, the opposition Waddani party is focusing on the lack of regional support for the MoU.
Seeking regional backing, members of the Waddani party within the Somaliland diaspora in Saudi Arabia have hinted that the opposition intends to disavow the MoU if they win. Their platform points out the agreement’s failure to deliver tangible results so far, highlighting Hargeisa’s inability to establish trade agreements with landlocked African nations, saying this harms Somaliland’s port of Berbera. Before the MoU was announced, Hargeisa and Addis Ababa were already negotiating agreements on trade and transport, which were intended to remove obstacles at the border. But since January, these discussions have stalled.
Campaign platforms
To distinguish themselves from the administration of President Muse Bihi Abdi, whom they criticise for his increasing authoritarianism, Waddani is keen to position itself as the party of dialogue, engaging both with Somaliland’s most remote and autonomist regions, and its neighbours. The party is focusing on building closer ties with Djibouti, and, to a certain extent, Mogadishu, both of which might view an opposition victory favourably.
Moreover, Waddani has benefited from the defections of former Kulmiye officials who know the president well, including former minister Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, who has led the opposition party since 2021. Hersi is also a cousin of Abdillahi Mohamed Duale, the founder of the money transfer company Dahabshiil, whose support is a significant asset in a campaign marked by clan rivalries and financial issues (see box below).
Muse Bihi’s campaign, on the other hand, portrays the MoU as a boon for Somaliland, rather than a bust. The president hopes to make an impression by signing more formal agreements with Addis Ababa before the election, possibly through a visit to Ethiopia’s capital this month.
Long-standing loyalists
However, any formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty seems unlikely in the immediate future. Worse still, Somalia’s national security adviser, Hussein Sheikh Ali, said that Ethiopia, in an interview with The New Humanitarian, had until the end of October to renounce the MoU, failing which it would have to pull its troops from Somalia. The outgoing African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), which is mandated to combat the militant group Al Shabab, includes 3,000 Ethiopian soldiers. Several thousand more are deployed under a bilateral security arrangement.
Nevertheless, ruling party strategists continue to explore ways to formalise certain clauses of the MoU, whose full text has yet to be made public. They are receiving guidance from former British attorney general Michael Ellis, who helped Somaliland draft the document. However, the future of the agreement has become more delicate since Djibouti proposed a joint management deal for the port of Tadjoura to Ethiopia in late August.
To promote the MoU and advance recognition of Somaliland as a sovereign state, Muse Bihi relies on long-time loyalists such as Bashe Awil Omar, a former ambassador to Kenya and the UAE. Earlier this year, the president instructed him to lead a task force to engage political and business representatives. Bashe, whose father-in-law, Ahmed Mohamed Mahamoud (known as Silanyo), founded the Kulmiye party, played a key role in bringing the Emirati logistics company DP World to the port of Berbera (AI, 22/09/17 and 27/02/15). The conclusions of this task force, which aims to establish the legal foundations of an agreement with Ethiopia, were submitted to the president on 30 July.
Clan rivalries and financial support
In addition to Hersi, Waddani enjoys financial support from a significant segment of the Somali diaspora based in the Gulf countries, the United Kingdom and the United States. The opposition party is also leveraging clan rivalries in the region to gather votes. Its candidate, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, known as Irro, a former National Assembly speaker and a candidate in the 2017 election, belongs to the Garhajis community, a branch of the Issaq clan, which has a strong presence in the capital, Hargeisa. This community is also represented within the diaspora in Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. To broaden its electoral base, Waddani has secured the backing of the Kaah party, led by Mohamoud Hashi Abdi, from the Habr Je’lo, the third sub-clan of the Issaq.
However, Muse Bihi, also an Issaq, has support from influential figures in the region and Djibouti’s business world. These include prominent entrepreneurs and traders in the Horn of Africa, such as Mohamed Said Guedi, the founder of the MSG Group of Companies, which specialises in cigarette distribution in East Africa, and Djama Omar Said, the founder of Ominco Group, active in the trade of food products and construction materials. Both men belong to the same sub-clan as the president, the Habr Awal.
The third candidate in the race, UCID party leader Faysal Ali Warabe, also, like Irro, a Garhajis, could still take some votes from Waddani’s candidate.
Africa Intelligence
