ANALYSIS
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has launched a new offensive against al-Shabaab in Somalia. It claims to have had major strategic victories. Analysts, however, warn that al-Shabaab cannot be wiped out with military force alone.
Questions are also being asked about the significant role played by neighbouring Ethiopia in the latest campaign.
On Friday 26 June 2015, AMISOM suffered one of its greatest setbacks yet. In the town of Leego, al-Shabaab attacked an AMISOM military base that was supposed to be well fortified and well defended by a contingent of Burundian troops. It was not.
Al-Shabaab militants killed dozens of soldiers (the exact body count is still disputed, but reports suggest that more than 50 were killed), taking full control of the base in the process. Beyond the tragic loss of life, the attack was devastating because it showed that al-Shabaab is far from the weakened force it was supposed to be by now.
AMISOM has been in the field for eight years, but the Islamist militant group is by no means on its last legs. It can do more than just suicide bombings and hit-and-run attacks, and it remains capable of taking AMISOM on at its own game – and winning.
The Leego attack also raised uncomfortable questions about AMISOM’s role in Somalia. Had the multinational force grown complacent? Was its Burundian contingent – deeply embarrassed by the defeat – distracted by the ongoing instability in Bujumbura?
AMISOM launches Operation Juba Corridor
AMISOM’s response was not long in coming. A month later, it released details of a new active military offensive against al-Shabaab. ‘This offensive, code-named Operation Juba Corridor, is aimed at further degrading al-Shabaab by removing them from their strongholds in the Gedo, Bakool and Bay regions of Somalia,’ AMISOM said in a statement.
Within a week, AMISOM was claiming major strategic victories and territorial gains.
‘Since the start of Operation Juba Corridor, which involves troops from the Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) and Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) contingents of AMISOM, supporting units of the Somalia National Army (SNA), and acting in collaboration with some of our strategic partners, major towns and villages such as Taraka, Jungal, Duraned, Eel-elaan, Habakhaluul, Meyon, Magalay, Duraned and the major town of Bardhere in the Gedo region have been recovered from al-Shabaab. In the Bakool region, the operation has resulted in the recovery of Buur-dhuhunle, Kulun-jareer, Moragabey, Legaly and Gelewoyni while Ufurow, Eesow, Hasanow-Mumin, LIidaale, Makoon, Dhargo and Manaas have been liberated in the Bay region,’ it said in a statement.
Do territorial gains mean real progress?
It is an impressive list, but analysts question whether these territorial gains really represent substantive progress.
‘The problem AMISOM has faced in previous offensives is that al-Shabaab just retreats, so AMISOM has had a hard time really destroying al-Shabaab assets rather than just dislodging them. So if it can improve on this then it could deal al-Shabaab a real blow.
‘However, the bigger problem is that it is impossible to completely wipe out al-Shabaab through military force. It’s also impossible for AMISOM to stop them doing the types of asymmetric and terror attacks they have focused on since 2013.
‘For these, al-Shabaab don’t need much money, weapons or troops and they can bide their time and choose their targets at will,’ said Paul Williams, Associate Professor at George Washington University and co-author of Counterinsurgency in Somalia: lessons learned from the African Union Mission in Somalia, 2007-2013.
The offensive also raised a couple of uncomfortable questions about AMISOM’s tactics, and its reliance on neighbouring countries.
One example: in an AFP report, elders from five villages in the southern Bakool region claimed that dozens of civilians had been killed as AMISOM troops passed through.
‘The number of civilians we have counted so far is over 50, but there are also more still missing after they have been arrested,’ said elder Abdulahi Isgowe. ‘We have never witnessed such a mass killing before.’
AMISOM has not responded directly to this claim in particular (and AMISOM’s spokespeople did not respond to repeated attempts by the PSC Report to contact them), but it has responded to other claims that its troops killed civilians in the Lower Shabelle town of Marka – although the statement shed little light on what actually happened.
‘[O]ur troops’ supply convoys have come under recurrent attacks by al-Shabaab. During these, in self-defence, troops have proportionately responded to such attacks. Nevertheless AMISOM regards any loss of innocent lives as tragic and we take all reports of such incidents seriously.’ AMISOM has pledged to investigate the claims, and recalled the officer in charge of troop operations in Marka as a precaution. It has also conducted meetings with local elders to try to calm the situation.
‘With regard to civilian casualties, this is what the militant group capitalises on to sway the Somali public to its side. It is a difficult terrain, but it is imperative that [AMISOM and the Somali National Army] do their utmost to limit collateral damage. The offensive against al-Shabaab should consciously include some form of integrated approach [that] addresses the local population’s needs and makes them feel secure. This may include facilitating political organisation and quick-impact projects,’ said Emmanuel Kisiangani, a senior researcher at the Institute for Security Studies.
Questions over Ethiopia’s role
The second question is about Ethiopia’s prominent role in Operation Juba Corridor. Ethiopian troops have spearheaded the new offensive, which has also been supported by air strikes by Ethiopia’s air force. In Ethiopia itself, the offensive has received major airtime on public broadcasters, with reporters embedded with Ethiopian military units. This is unusual, and indicates that Ethiopia has decided to take an even more active role in the conflict.
While there is no doubt that AMISOM needs all the support it can get, it is far from clear that Ethiopia is best placed to provide it, given the long and contentious history between the two countries. It is worth remembering that although both the Kenyan and the Ethiopian forces are now part of AMISOM, their involvement began unilaterally, and they only assumed the mantle of the continental force retroactively. In other words, both countries have their own interests in Somalia, which may not always be aligned with AMISOM’s stated objectives.
‘Peace operations everywhere run a big risk when neighbouring states are the key troop-contributing countries. In this case having Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti as key AMISOM players might help militarily but it complicates the politics of the mission and perhaps also the broader search for conflict resolution and reconciliation in Somalia,’ said Williams. It is to avoid exactly these potential conflicts of interest that the United Nations generally discourages neighbouring countries from participating in peacekeeping operations.
Although AMISOM is hailing Operation Juba Corridoras a triumph, the truth is that it remains too early to make that determination.
Because of the nature of al-Shabaab, retaking territory is not necessarily a marker of success; far more significant would be to degrade the militant group’s middle and senior leadership positions. And those claims of civilian casualties, if left unchecked, may strengthen al-Shabaab’s propaganda and weaken local support for AMISOM and the Somali Federal Government.
Ethiopia’s high-profile involvement, meanwhile, could also backfire if it is perceived as another Ethiopian invasion rather than a genuine peacekeeping mission (many argue that Ethiopia’s 2006 invasion of Somalia to remove the Islamic Courts Union from power is what precipitated the al-Shabaab problem in the first place).
What we can conclude from the new offensive, however, is that the defeat at Leego was only a temporary setback. AMISOM remains a potent fighting force, and a key player in the long fight for a stable Somali state.
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